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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
courts

Does §l52(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code bar state
from ordering a custodial parent to execute documents

necessary for the non-custodial parent to claim a dependent tax
exemption?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering that both

parties bear their own attorneys' fees on appeal given that neither
party prevailed on appeal and plaintiff has substantial resources
from which to pay her attorneys' fees?

OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff petitions for certiorari of the opinion of the Court
of Appeals of Utah in the matter of Motes v. Motes,
50, 786 P. 2d 232 (Nov. 6, 1989) rehearing

denied,

121 Ut. Adv. Rpt.
(Jan. 29, 1990).

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdictioh over the Petition for
Certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§78-2-3(a) and 78-2a-4
(1987)
APPLICABLE AUTHORITY
1.

26

U. S. c.

§152(e)(2)

(1988).

described in paragraph JS152/eJU / D

A

child

of

shall be treated as

parents
having

received over half of his support during a calendar year from the
noncustodial parent if:
(A)

the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in

such manner and form as the Secretary may be regulations
prescribe) that such custodial parent will not claim such

- 1 -

child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such
calendar year, and
(B)

the

declaration

noncustodial

to

the

parent

noncustodial

attaches

parent' s

such

return

written
for

the

taxable year beginning during such calendar year.
2.

Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (1989).

The court may order

either party to pay the clerk a sum of money for the separate
support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and
to enable such party to prosecute or defend the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The
Complaint

instant

case

for Divorce,

was

initiated

which was

by

filed

plaintiff s

Verified

in the Third

Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on April 23,
1986.

Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce on

March 19, 1987.

The case was tried on July 30, 1987 before the

Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Court Judge.
appeared in person and through counsel.

Defendant

Plaintiff appeared pro-

se, as her counsel had withdrawn shortly before trial (R. 151; R.
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 3).
At the time of trial, the parties stipulated to division of
the

majority

of

household

goods

and

personal

property.

In

addition, the parties agreed to allege irreconcilable differences
as the grounds for divorce and defendant agreed that custody of the
parties' minor children could remain with the plaintiff.
The principle issues that were contested at trial include:
1.

Division of the defendant' s military retirement;
_ 9

-

2.

Division

of

the

plaintiff s

inheritance

and

the

appreciation thereon; and
3.

Award of child support and alimony.

On those issues, the trial court:
1.

Ordered the defendant to pay child support of $175. 00 per

month for each of the parties' three minor children for a total of
$525. 00 (Findings and Conclusions at p. 6, para. 5; Decree at p.
6, para. 5). l
2.

Awarded each party $1.00 per year as alimony (Findings

and Conclusions at p. 7, para. 9; Decree at page 3, para. 9).

and

3.

Ruled that both the $140,000.00 inherited by plaintiff

the

$32, 384. 00

investment
estate.

generated

in

of the inheritance were

part

from

not assets

the

defendant' s

of the

marital

Therefore neither of those funds were divided between the

parties (Findings and Conclusions at p. 12 and 15, paras. 26 and
37; Decree at pp. 3 and 10-11, paras. 26 and 37).
4.

Ruled that division of the retirement benefits accrued

by both plaintiff and defendant be postponed until defendant' s
support obligation was satisfied—after the parties' last child
reached the age of majority or graduated from high school (Findings
and Conclusions at page 14, para 35; Decree at p. 10, para. 35).

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in
this case are pages 190-205 of the record on appeal.
For the
court' s convenience, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
are attached to this brief as Exhibit "A" and are cited herein as
"Findings and Conclusions." The Decree of Divorce, record pages
206-219, is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and cited as "Decree."
- ^ -

5.

Ruled that defendant should be permitted to take a tax

exemption for the parties' youngest child so long as he remained
current

in his

plaintiff

to

support

execute

obligation and,
the

documents

therefore,

necessary

to

ordered

the

permit

the

defendant to claim that exemption (Findings and Conclusions at page
7, para. 6; Decree at p. 2, para 6).
Plaintiff appealed the trial court' s decision, contesting the
deferral of division of the defendant' s retirement plan and the
trial court's decision to award one federal income tax exemption
to the defendant.

Plaintiff requested an award of attorneys' fees

on appeal.
Defendant filed a cross-appeal, contesting the trial court' s
determination

that

the

appreciation

earned

on

plaintiff s

inheritance was not marital property despite the fact that the
trial court also found that the appreciation was, at least in part,
attributable to defendant' s services.
Judges Orme, Billings and Greenwood, sitting for the Court of
Appeals held that:
1. "The retirement plans of both parties should have been
treated as marital assets and definitively dealt with in a Decree
as part of an equitable property distribution between the parties."
Motes

v.
2.

Motes,

786 P. 2d 232, 235.

"The Court's distribution of the parties' properties and

award of child support was inextricably linked.

The court should

reconsider disposition of the proceeds earned on the plaintiff s
inheritance by virtue of defendant' s services and the award of
- A -

Id.

child support upon remand. "

The Court noted that it would not

"necessarily be inappropriate to award defendant's share of the
inheritance profits to plaintiff in exchange for the retirement
benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled. "

786 P. 2d at

235, n. 3
3.

Section 152(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code does not

prohibit a state court from ordering a custodial parent to execute
documents necessary to allow the non-custodial to claim a dependent
exemption for federal income tax purposes.

786 P. 2d at 240.

Plaintiff then filed a petition for rehearing arguing that the
Court of Appeals should remand the case to the trial court only to
allow the trial court to divide the parties' retirement accounts
and to determine an appropriate award of attorneys' fees in favor
of

plaintiff.

Plaintiff

also

argued

that

the

court

should

reconsider its decision on the tax exemption issue as the decision
conflicted with the Court of Appeals
Martinez,

754 P. 2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert,

1277 (Utah 1988); and Fullmer

v.

App.

Appeals

1988).

rehearing.

decisions

The
See,

Court

Motes

v.

of
Motes,

Fullmer,

in Martinez

granted,

v.

765 P. 2d

761 P. 2d 942 (Utah Ct.
denied

the

petition

for

786 P. 2d at 240.

The plaintiff s petition for certiorari asks that this Court
review the Court of Appeals decision insofar as it affirms the
trial court' s decision to order the plaintiff to execute documents
necessary to allow defendant to claim one child as an exemption for
federal tax purposes and denies plaintiff s requests for attorneys'
fees.
- 5 -

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The

parties

were

the

only

witnesses

called

at

trial.

Testimony relevant to the issues now on appeal established the
following facts:
The defendant joined the United States Army, as a private,
on June 21, 1960, and a year later obtained an appointment to the
United States Military Academy at West Point (R. 239, Tr. July 30,
1987, at p. 66). The defendant graduated from the military academy
in June of 1965 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in engineering
(R. 239, Tr. July

30, 1987, at pp.

50-51).

The parties

were

married on February 11, 1967, (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p.
66).

In

1977, while

serving

in the military,

the

defendant

obtained a Masters of Business Administration from the University
of Utah (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 50).
Defendant retired from the military in June of 1984 (R. 239,
Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 66).

Upon retirement, defendant began

receiving monthly payments from his military pension, which net him
approximately $1, 149. 00 per month (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at
p. 67). After leaving the military, he began working in the area
of financial planning (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 69). Due
to difficulties in establishing a clientele and generating a return
on investments, at the time of the divorce the defendant7 s business
was operating at a net monthly loss of income (R. 2 3 9, Tr. July 30,
1987, at pp. 90-91). The defendant's income also includes a monthly
payment of $315. 00 received pursuant to a contract for the sale of
the parties' home in El Paso, Texas and approximately $11.83 per
- A _

month in interest and dividends (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p.
6).

Thus, the defendant's net monthly income at the time of the

divorce was approximately $1,475.83. The majority of that income
is the income from the pension and, as the defendant testified, he
needs that income for his living expenses

(R. 239, Tr. July 27,

1987 at p. 72).
The

plaintiff

completed

her

nursing

education

and

began

working on her Master7 s Degree during the parties' marriage (R.
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 191).

At the time of trial, she was

taking non-credit courses and estimated, at that rate, it would
take her five or six years to finish the Master' s program (R. 239,
Tr.

July 30, 1987, at pp. 51-53).

She started working for the

University of Utah Medical Center in 1980.

She is now a nursing

supervisor at the University of Utah Medical Center, in charge of
approximately 650 employees and she testified that her Master' s
training would assist her in advancing in her career (R. 239, Tr.
July 30, 1987, at pp. 52-56).

The plaintiff had, at the time of

the divorce, a gross monthly income of $2,205.00 and a net income
of approximately $1,745.00 (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 6).
In December of 1985, the plaintiff inherited approximately
$100,000.00

(R.

239, Tr.

July

30,

1987, at p.

38). She

gave

$60,000.00 to the defendant to invest for the parties' children
(R.

239, Tr.

July

30,

1987, at p.

38). In February

of 1985,

plaintiff inherited approximately another $40,000.00 in cash (R.
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 41), and the defendant invested an
additional $20,000.00.

At the time of divorce, the $80,000.00
- 7 -

invested by the defendant had increased to $112,384.00; a gain of
$32,384.00 (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987 at p. 39 and 49).
The parties separated in April of 1986. At the time of trial,
plaintiff was 44 years of age and defendant was 45 years of age (R.
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 5).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE FOR THE FIRST TIME ADDRESSED
WHETHER A TRIAL COURT MAY ORDER A CUSTODIAL PARENT TO
EXECUTE DOCUMENTS NECESSARY TO ALLOW THE NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT
TO CLAIM A DEPENDENT TAX EXEMPTION. THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT NOTHING IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
BARS SUCH AN ORDER
Plaintiff argues that this Court should grant her petition
for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals decision confirming
the trial court' s order requiring plaintiff to execute documents
necessary under §152(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code to permit
defendant to claim one dependent tax exemption for federal income
tax purposes.

Plaintiff

asserts that the decision in

conflicts with the Court of Appeals' earlier decisions in
v. Fullmer

and Martinez

v. Martinez.

Motes
Fullmer

The plaintiff argues that the

inconsistency in the decisions of Martinez,

Fullmer,

and

Motes

creates uncertainty and "result[s] in a total absence of guidance
as to what the state of the law is in Utah relative to allocation
of tax

exemptions. "

See,

Plaintiff s Petition

for Writ of

Certiorari at page 14.
The great weight of plaintiff s argument rests not in the
decisions of the Court of Appeals in Martinez
- 8 -

or Fullmer

but upon

the

underlying

facts

of

the

Martinez

case

which

are

addressed in the Court of Appeals decision in Martinez.
plaintiff s argument is that the Court of Appeals
addressed in Martinez

nowhere

Therefore,
should have

the issue of whether a court may order a

custodial parent to execute forms permitting a non-custodial parent
tax exemption.

The fact is that the Court of Appeals did not

address that issue in Martinez.

Instead, the Court of Appeals held

that a temporary stipulation and separation agreement distributing
the parties' dependent tax exemptions was not a "qualified pre-1985
instrument"
Internal
general

as

that

Revenue
rule

term

is

defined

Code that would

that

the

justify

custodial

exemptions for dependent children.
court

noted

that

the defendant

under

parent

§152(e)(4)

the

an exception

to the

is

to

entitled

7 54 P. 2d at 72.
failed

of

The

to establish

tax

Martinez

any

other

exception to the general rule and concluded, therefore, that the
custodial parent was entitled to the tax exemption.
In Fullmer,

Id.

the trial court awarded the respondent a dependent

tax exemption when the court changed the award of custody provided
in the original divorce decree and awarded custody of the dependent
to the respondent.

761 P.2d at 945.

The Court of Appeals stayed

the order changing custody and ultimately reversed that order and
the appellant remained the custodial parent.

761 P. 2d at 950.

The appellant had signed no waiver allowing Respondent' s claim to
the parties' child as a tax exemption and, apparently, the Court
had not ordered the custodial parent to execute such a waiver.

Id.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court
- 9 -

erred in awarding the non-custodial parent a tax exemption for the
Id.

parties' child.

In sum, as the Court of Appeals admits in its decision in
Motes,

while Fullmer

award

of

and Martinez

a dependent

tax

both address the issue of an

exemption

for

federal

tax purposes,

neither case directly addresses the issue of whether a trial court
may order the custodial parent to execute a wavier as permitted
under §152(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code as an exception to
the general rule that a custodial parent is entitled to the tax
exemption.
in Motes

Motes

v. Motes,

786 P. 2d at 235.

The Court of Appeals

proceeded to remedy its omissions in Martinez

and

Fullmer

with an analysis of legislative history and case authority that is
sufficiently complete to render the opinion the equivalent of a law
review

article

on

the

topic

of whether

a

court

may

custodial parent to waive a dependent tax exemption.

order

a

786 P.2d at

236-239.
As a result of that analysis, the Court of Appeals concluded
that:2
prohibits

(1) nothing
a trial

in the

language

of

26

U. S.C.

§152(e)(2)

court from ordering the custodial parent to

execute a waiver of a dependent tax exemption.

786 P. 2d at 236;

(2) the purpose behind §152(e)(2) is satisfied so long as a court
orders a custodial parent to execute a wavier of right to a tax
exemption

when

allocating

the

exemption

to

the

non-custodial

Defendant herein presents only a brief synopsis of the
Court of Appeals decision.
The decision is attached as Exhibit

parent,

id.

at

236-237;

(3)

the

"vast

majority

of

other

jurisdictions" that have confronted this issue have "concluded that
state courts retain the authority to order the custodial parent to
execute" a waiver of their dependent tax exemption. 3

Id.

at 237,

The Court of Appeals did not conclude that trial courts have
unfettered discretion in ordering a custodial parent to waive their
dependent
Instead,

tax
the

exemption,
court

found

in allocating
that

there

dependent exemptions.

must

exist

exceptional

circumstances that justify allocation of tax exemptions to the noncustodial parent and noted that the trial court must make specific
findings that such exceptional circumstances exist.

The court did

not determine whether the trial court7 s findings were sufficient
in the instant case to support its allocation of the parties
dependent exemptions.

Indeed, as noted by the Court of Appeals,

it would have been superfluous for the court to have made such an
analysis as the entire matter has been remanded to the trial court
for "extensive reassessment of property and support questions."
Id.

at 240.
In sum, the Court of Appeals holding in Motes is that, under

some circumstances, it may be permissible for a trial court to

While the Court of Appeals chose to follow the majority
position, the court acknowledged that a minority of the courts hold
that §152(e)(2) prohibits the trial court from ordering a custodial
parent to execute a waiver of their tax exemption. 786 P.2d at
238. The Court of Appeals rejected the minority view because the
court concluded that the majority position was more soundly based
in law and more equitable in practice. Id. at 239. Based upon
those conclusions, the court held that a trial court may order a
custodial parent to execute the documents necessary to waive their
right to a dependent tax exemption.
-11-

order a custodial parent to execute a waiver of a dependent tax
exemption and nothing in the Internal Revenue Code prohibits such
an order.
Far from confusing the state of the lav/ of allocation of tax
exemptions in Utah, the Court of Appeals' thorough analysis finally
puts

the issue to rest.

Consequently,

defendant

respectfully

requests that plaintiff s Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied
and that this matter be permitted to proceed, once again, toward
the goal of reaching a resolution of the parties' divorce dispute
in the trial court pursuant to the Order of the Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff argues "parenthetically" that the Uniform Child
Support Guidelines now in place were developed based upon
calculations that assume exemptions are granted to the custodial
parent.
See Petition to the Supreme Court of Utah for a Writ of
Certiorari. Those child support guidelines were not in effect when
the trial court reached its decision on child support in this case.
Therefore plaintiff s argument is not persuasive in this case.
Moreover, while the child support guidelines certainly support a
presumption
that,
under
ordinary
circumstances,
dependent
exemptions should be awarded to the custodial parent, the
guidelines are not a basis for the conclusion that even where
exceptional circumstances exist, the trial court has no power to
order the custodial parent to waive a tax exemption so that the
non-custodial parent may claim the benefit of that exemption. Such
an absolute bar may lead to results that are actually detrimental
to both parents and the dependent child. For instance, if the noncustodial parent' s income is larger than contemplated under the
child support guidelines, the non-custodial parent may well receive
the greatest benefit from the dependent tax exemption. Therefore
trial courts will be faced with the practical choice of either
allocating the exemption to the non-custodial parent and increasing
child support so that both parties and the child benefit from that
exemption or leaving the exemption in place with the custodial
parent and decreasing the child support obligation to offset the
income lost to taxes.
- 12 -

POINT II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES WAS NOT WARRANTED IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Plaintiff

argues

that

she

is

entitled

to

an

award

of

attorneys' fees because she "prevailed" in a case at the Court of
Appeals.

Even assuming that allegation were correct, the rule in

this state is not that a party that prevails on appeal is entitled
to attorneys' fees.
authorized

under

Utah

Instead, an award of attorneys' fees is
Code Annotated

§30-3-3

Maughn v. Maughn, 770

justified on the basis of financial need.
P. 2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Rasband
1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988).

(1989) and is

v. Rasband,

752 P. 2d

In the instant case, plaintiff left

the parties' marriage in a much better financial position than
defendant.

Plaintiff had both a higher monthly income than

defendant and, because of her inheritance which exceeds one hundred
thousand dollars, she has much greater financial reserves.

Under

those circumstances, if an award of attorneys' fees were to be
made, it should have been to the defendant.
Moreover, if the rule were that the prevailing party on appeal
is entitled to attorneys' fees, the Court of Appeals in this case
would have been faced with an interesting conundrum.

In this case,

the plaintiff prevailed in her argument that the parties retirement
funds should be immediately distributed.

On the other hand, the

Court of Appeals, almost as an aside, also disagreed with the trial
court' s ruling that the appreciation on the fund inherited by
plaintiff was not marital property subject to distribution.

_

1 *5

-

786

P. 2d at 235.
appeal.

Thus, the defendant also prevailed on his cross-

Consequently, in this case, both parties won on appeal,

or more accurately in this case, both parties lost.

The parties

remain in conflict, although their divorce was initiated four (4)
years ago and they have been divorced in excess of three (3) years.
Plaintiff

has

the

financial

resources

conflict if she chooses to do so.
not

necessary

Instead,

to

allow

the

continue

with

this

An award of attorneys' fees is

plaintiff

an award of attorneys'

to

to

pursue

fees in this

her

action.

case would be a

punitive measure which would accomplish little more than adding
fuel to a fire that should have long since died.
Consequently, defendant respectfully requests that this Court
deny the Plaintiff s Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the Court
of Appeals decision to require both parties to bear their own costs
on appeal.
DATED this

day of April, 1990.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL

^ J U L I E A. /feRYAN
Attorney for Respondent/Cross Appellant

The Court of Appeals noted that it "may be proper to award
defendant' s share of the inheritance profits to the plaintiff in
exchange for retirement benefits to which she would otherwise be
entitled" and adopted authority cited by defendant in a supplement
to his respondent' s brief for the proposition that the growth in
the inherited funds may be marital property subject to division.
786 P. 2d at 235, n. 3.
_

1A

_
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I hereby certify that on the ^C^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF

UTAH

* * * * * * * *

BARBARA MOTES,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
PRESTON MOTES,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. D86-1615
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the court for
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.
representing herself.

The plaintiff was present in person,

The defendant was present in person and

represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.

The court discussed

the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved by
agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the parties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following as
its

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

parties

were

both

residents

of

Salt

Lake

County, State of Utah, on the date this action was filed and each
had been so for more than three months immediately prior thereto.
2.

The parties are husband and wife, having been mar-

ried February 11, 1967, in Ardmore, Pennsylvania.
3.

There have been

four children born as issue of

this marriage, three of whom, Kimberly, age 16, born October 19,
1970; Tamara, age 14, born October 5, 1972; and Charissa, age 13,
born December 27, 1973, are minors.
4.

The parties agreed that care, custody and control

of the minor children of the parties should be awarded to the
plaintiff,

subject

to

liberal

rights

of

visitation

by

the

defendant.
5.

The plaintiff

is

44 years of age, is presently

employed as a nursing supervisor, where she supervises more than
650 employees

at

the University

of Utah Hospital and earns a

gross income of $2,205.00 per month.
6.

The plaintiff acquired her nursing education dur-

ing the course of the marriage.
7.
the

United

The defendant is 45 years of age, a graduate of
States

M.B.A. earned
marriage.
tary

and

from

Military

Academy

at West

Point

the University of Utah acquired

and has

an

during

the

He is presently retired from the United States Milireceives

$1,484.00

a month
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as

retirement

pay.

In

addition, he receives $315.00 a month as payment on a note for
the sale of property owned by the parties in El Pasof Texas, and
has earned, on an average basis, commissions from his employer,
Waddell & Reed, as a financial planner, $248.00 a month.

He has

incurred expenses in conducting his business at Waddell & Reed of a*u/^ul^

A
$330.00 a month.
8.

In February, 1985, the plaintiff's father died.

When the parties went to the home that he had occupied, they
found

and

removed

plaintiff's

from

the

home

$30,000.00

in cash.

The

father made plaintiff his sole heir and she has

inherited the said $30,000.00 in cash at the time of her father's
death, $100,000.00
1986;

and

$140,500.00.

in December, 1985; $7,500.00

$3,000.00

in

December,

1986,

for

in November,
a

total

of

The estate has not been finally distributed, but

most of it has been disbursed.
9.

After the parties removed the $30,000.00 from the

plaintiff's father's home, $20,000.00 was given to the defendant
by the plaintiff to invest for their children and accounts were
opened up in the sum of $5,000.00 for each of the four children
"of

the

parties.

After

the

$100,000.00

payment

had

been

received, an additional $10,000.00 was set aside for each of the
children of the parties.

There are, now, $15,000.00 plus earn-

ings in the accounts of each of the children of the parties for a
total of $60,000 plus earnings.
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10.

The parties acquired a home and real property at

1516 South Wasatch Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, in which they
have accumulated an equity of ^O^O1/ A-23.00; a note from the sale of
property in El Paso, Texas, valued at $35,000.00; IRA accounts,
in

the

United

Funds,

$17,350.00;

Continental,

$8,000.00;

Magelland Fund, $19,083.00; stock accounts in the Fidelity Destiny Fund, $41,263.00; shares of stock in AT&T and the other Bell
companies plus accumulated reinvested dividends presently valued
at $3,800.00; an account at Wilson-Davis for various penny stocks
valued at $50.00; a 1980 Oldsmobile, valued a t / $ * w « * ; a 1982
Volvo automobile, valued" at/ ^^^SFSSS}

a 1986 Jetta automobile,

valued at^$7,000.00W a fund for payment of taxes in the Vanguard
Fund of $1,149.00; and an Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy with a
present cash value of $3,100.00.
11.
employment

at

The plaintiff has a retirement account through her
the University

of

Utah

Hospital with a present

vjpuac e€ $5,129.00; her own checking account at the Credit Union
for the balance of $7,6 80.00, and a Pentagon Credit Union Account
with a balance of $3,721.00.
12.
Defense

Center

The defendant has a savings account at the Air
Credit

Union

of

$375.00;

a

checking

account

through the Air Defense Center Credit Union of $1,000.00; a Pentagon Credit Union Account of $275.00; and checking account at
First Security Bank of $500.00.
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13,

The parties have fought for a substantial period

of time and have demonstrated that there are irreconcilable differences between them in terms of their goals, values and how
they treat each other, which make continuation of their marriage
relationship impossible.
14.

The defendant

inherited by the plaintiff

invested

a portion of the money

and imr investments have produced

earnings'-^ $32,384.00.
15.
pendency of

Both of the parties disposed of assets during the
this matter.

16.

The plaintiff is presently enrolled in school, as

well as being employed and hopes to obtain a Master's Degree
which she believes will be necessary

to further her nursing

career.
17.

The court discussed with the parties division of

their personal property from a list prepared by the defendant and
they agreed to divide the personal items between them as is hereup,

inafter set out.
18.

.

The plaintiff desires that her/name be changed to

Barbara Van Asdlan.
19.

Each of the parties employed counsel to represent

them in this matter. Counsel for the plaintiff withdrew shortly
before the trial and the plaintiff chose to represent herself,
rather than employ new counsel.
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From

the

foregoing

Findings

of Fact, the

court

now

makes and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of

Divorce from the other, said Decrees to become final upon entry.
2.

Care, custody and control of the minor children of

the parties should be awarded to the plaintiff, subject to liberal rights of visitation by the defendant.
3.

The defendant and

their own visitation

the children are to work

arrangements

upon

24-hour

advance

out

notice

with which the plaintiff should not interfere.
4.
ited

Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-

from deTTG%at±ftg

the other

to the children or taking

action to involve the children in their disputes.

any

Each should be

supportive of the other as the parent of the children.
5.

The defendant should be ordered to pay the sum of

$175.00 per child per month as child

support for each of

the

children until that child attains the age of 18 and/or graduates
from high school with his or her age-appropriate

class.

The

defendant should be enjoined from placing any initials or comments on the checks;J^

One-half of the child support should be

paid on or before the 5th of each month and one-half should be
paid on or before the 20th of each month.

This order regarding

child support should become effective August 1, 1987.
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6.

The defendant should bet awarded the youngest child

,c

of the parties, Charissa, as his tax dependent,! and -he plaintiffs £& ^w* <*L
should be ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal "^ tP'^*'?
Revenue Service to effect this award.
7.

All child support payments from and after the

entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter should be made
through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court.
8.

A withhold and deliver order should be authorized

to be executed should the defendant fall more than 30 days behind
in the payment of his child support.
9.

Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as

alimony from the other.
10.

Each of the parties should be ordered to retain

their existing life insurance policies for the minor children of
the

parties

until

child

support

for

the

youngest

child

terminates.
11.

Each party should be ordered

to maintain such

health, accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as
they have available to them through their employment for the benefit of the minor children of the parties for so long as they may
provide such insurance protection under the terms and conditions
of the applicable insurance policies and each should be ordered
to pay one-half of any uninsured medical,/ dental, hospital or
orthodontic expenses.
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ft' * M-%^A
12.

The plaintiff should have her name ^ateee to the

name of Van Asdlan.
13.

Each of the parties should be ordered to sign all

documents and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions
of the Decree of Divorce.
14.

The agreement of the parties regarding division of

their personal property should be accepted by the court and,
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items:
a.
The bedroom set located in the master bedroom, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and
nightstands;
b.

One of the large down comforters;

c.

His West Point blanket;

d.

The

two

table

lamps with

the

tripod-type

base;
The sofa and loveseat located in the family
room;
f.
The glass-topped
used as an endtable for the sofa;
g.

The

clay

table

table
lamp

in the family room
on

the

glass-topped

table;
h.
The large Sand painting given as a birthday
present to the defendant;
i.

The Frace eagle over the fireplace;

j.

The Ray Harm eagle print;

k.

The silver West Point plate;

1.

The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl;
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The West Point print;
The "Old Man" painting;
Six of the etchings;
The Merimbege River painting;
Two of the Hughes paintings;
Two large Sansui speakers;
Two channel tape drive;
Two Kenwood speakers;
Pioneer tuner;
Phonograph turntable;
AKAI tapedeck (two channel);
Two of the three wall clocks;
Apple computer, printer and software;
The flower set of Franciscan china;
The Sango china;
The set of Nachmann whisky beakers;
The Rosenthal crystal;
Copper pots and pans;
Pewterware; plates, cups, goblets, pitcher,
Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy
Desk in the laundry room;
The old green table from "Pops;"
One cardtable with one round piece of glass
piece;
The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar;
-S-

11.
The National Geographic books and magazines
and the bookcase in the study;
mm.

Handtools and power tools;

nn.

The aquarium;

oo.
All of
items, including uniforms;

Defendant's

personal

clothing

and

pp.
All items purchased by Defendant before marriage to include textbooks and records;
qq.

Remainder of the flatware set;

rr.

Balance of Defendant's business records.

ss.

Large china hutch obtained from P. D. 0. in

Germany;
15.

The plaintiff should be specifically awarded
a.

The Gieol painting;

b.

Two Bassett paintings;

c.

The four-channel tape drive;

d.

Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer);

e.

SANSUI tuner;

f.

Grundig console and six speakers;

g.

AKAI tape deck (larger);

h.

Cassette deck;

i.

One of the three wall clocks;

j.

Pewter candlesticks;

k.

French hutch;

1.

Twelve Hummel figurines;

m.

One set of tools for use around the house/;
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AU/p AA****^

16.

The defendant should be ordered :o make available

to the plaintiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so
that they can be reproduced on a cassette, cbjjf******^ ^ ^ **
"^

'

personal^

"T^J?**?

17. Each of the parties should be awarded all items of
property

in

his/her

possession

not

hereinabove

specified.
18.

The defendant should be ordered to make available

to the plaintiff any picturesf photographs or slides which she
wishes duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense.
19.
accounts

of

The

plaintiff

the children

should

be

established

awarded
with

all of the

funds

from the

plaintiff's inheritance and the right and obligation to manage
those accounts, and the defendant should be ordered to take
appropriate steps to turn those over to the plaintiff.
20.

All right, title and interest

in the home on

Wasatch Drive should be awarded to the plaintiff, free of any
interest of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first
mortgage and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately
$4,000.00 due to the Pentagon Credit Union and approximately
$3,500.00 to the Norwest Credit Union.

The plaintiff should be

responsible for these obligations from and after August 1, 1987,
and should be ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom.
21.

The Trinidad note should be awarded to the defen-

dant, free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.
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22.

Each of the parties should be awarded one of the

Horizon lots which have no present value.
23.

The defendant should be awarded the interest of

the parties in the United funds IRA Account; the Fidelity Destiny
Fund; the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid

Insurance

Policy; the Air Defense Center Savings account; the Air Defense
Center checking account; his Pentagon Credit Union account; and
Defendant's First Security checking account.
24.
IRA

account;

The plaintiff
the

Magellan

should be awarded
fund;

the

family

the Continental
AT&T

stock;

her

accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union; and Plaintiff's
Pentagon Credit Union account.
25.

The

defendant

should

be

awarded

the

1980

Oldsmobile and the plaintiff should be awarded the 1982 Volvo and
the 1986 Jetta. *
26.

Thef/$32,384.00 earned by •4sho-xhif ondant through hisr

Nr- trv\

•ma'rraf^tfreft-fc—©pff the property inherited by the plaintiff should be
considered a non-asset of the marriage.
27.

The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement

of the account balance due as of May 1, 1986.
with having paid $140.00 on that account.

He is credited

Each of the parties

shall be obligated to pay one-half of that account balance.

If,

after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the defendant, there is
any money due below $140.00, that should be paid by the plaintiff.

If the amount due, after credit of the $140.00 is more
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than $140.00, the defendant snould pay that sum to the plaintiff
or judgment shall be entered in her favor for one-half of the
balance over $280,00.

If the defendant, by paying $140.00 shall

have paid more than one-half of the amount that was due on May 1,
1986f the amount by which he has exceeded payment of one-half of
the balance due should be a credit against the child support he
shall have been ordered to pay.
28.

If there are orthodontic bills due which have not

been paid by insurance, each of the parties should pay one-half
of that unpaid balance and one-half

of any counseling bills

incurred for and on behalf of the children.

If there is a bill

for counseling for the defendant, he should pay it himself.
29.

The defendant should be ordered to pay the obliga-

tions due to MasterCharge and First Security Bank and to hold the
plaintiff harmless therefrom.
30.

Each of the parties should assume, pay and hold

the other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since
their separation.
31.

Each of the parties should assume and pay their

own costs and fees as incurred in this matter.
32.
by

the

The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid

defendant

should

be denied,

as she

has

substantial

resources of her own to pay her own fees.
33.

The defendant should be ordered to verify that all

of the checks he testified he has transmitted to the plaintiff
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shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her.

If he deter-

mines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he should be
ordered

to put

stop

orders

against

those

checks

and write

replacement checks.
34.

Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-

ited from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting
to intimidate the other

in any way, wherever they may be or

reside.
35.

The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims

that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who
contends that the fund is an income stream, not an asset because
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that
the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement pay (upon which tne
court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties
should be reserved until the obligation to pay child support
terminates.
36.

The court declares that it believes that it has

divided the property of the parties with/ $87,707.00 being awarded
to the plaintiff and/$99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^
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and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for financial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate.
37.

The court has determined that it should award to

the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting
that as #part of the marital estate, although the defendant has
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the
inheritance^through the management of the defendant be considered
as a marital asset.
DATED this

H ^

day of

3^^°^

, 1987.

KfeNNETH RIGTRUP' V
District Court Judge
,~v t

i

t.~~->

H DIXON HSNOLEY
CLERK
By /fc^^^/22^-7-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following on this

/yd
/<y"
day of

September, 1987:
Ms. Barbara Van Asdlan
1516 South Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake Cityy__Utah
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
DSD:080487K
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

QEC211887
Deputy C!e

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

% k QL>3 H O b S T l

BARBARA J. MOTES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. D86-1615
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

PRESTON J. MOTES,
Defendant.

* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the court for
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.

The plaintiff was present in person

and representing herself.

The defendant was present in person

and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.

The court dis-

cussed the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved
by agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the parties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being
advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

ETVLIfonr n

1.

Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce

from the other, said Decree to become final upon entry.
2.

Care, custody and control of the minor children of

the parties

is awarded to the plaintiff, subject to liberal

rights of visitation by the defendant,
3*

The defendant

and the children shall work out

their own visitation arrangements upon 24-hour advance notice
with which the plaintiff shall not interfere.
4.

Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited

from de&^^t^g the other to the children or taking any action to
involve the children in their disputes.

Each shall be supportive

of the other as the parent of the children.
5.

The defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $175.00

per child per month as child support for each of the children
until that child attains the age of 18 and graduates from high
school with his or her age-appropriate class.

The defendant is

enjoined from placing any initials or comments on the checks.
One-half of tne child support shall be paid on or before the 5th
of each month and one-half shall be paid on or before the 20th of
each month.

This order regarding child support shall become

effective August lf 1987.
6.

The defendant^ is awarded the youngest child of the

parties, Charissa, as his tax dependent,[^and the plaintiff

*

s

.
^p ??^

ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal Revenue (p*^*}
Service to effect this award.
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I.

All child

support payments

from and after the

entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter shall be made
through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court*
8.

A withhold and deliver order is authorized to be

executed, should the defendant fall more than 30 days behind in
the payment of his child support.
9.

Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as

alimony from the other.
10.

Each of the parties is ordered to retain their

existing life insurance policies for the minor children of the
parties until child support for the youngest child terminates.
II.

Each party is ordered to maintain such health,

accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as they have
available to them through their employment for the benefit of the
minor children of the parties for so long as they may provide
such insurance protection under the terms and conditions of the
applicable insurance policies and each is ordered to pay one-half
of

any

uninsured

medical,/ dental,

expenses.

hospital

or

orthodontic

^
12.

The plaintiff should be o&Angod to the name of Van

13.

Each of the parties is ordered to sign all docu-

Asdlan.

ments and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions of
this Decree of Divorce.
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14.

The agreement of the parties regarding division of

their personal property should be accepted by the court and,
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items:
a.
The bedroom set located in the master bedroom, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and
nightstands;
b.

One of the large down comforters;

c«

His West Point blanket;

d.

The

e.

The sofa and loveseat located in the family

two table

lamps with

the

tripod-type

base;
room;
f.
The glass-topped
used as an endtable for the sofa;
g.

The

clay

table

table
lamp

in the family room
on

the

glass-topped

table;
h.
The large Sand painting given as a birthday
present to the defendant;
i.

The Frace eagle over the fireplace;

j.

The Ray Harm eagle print;

k.

The silver West Point plate;

1.

The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl;

m.

The West Point print;

n.

The "Old Man" painting;

p.

Six of the etchings;

q.

The Merimbege River painting;

r.

Two of the Hughes paintings;

s.

Two large Sansui speakers;
-4-

t.

Two channel tape drives;

u.

Two Kenwood speakers;

v,

Sansui tuner;

w.

Phonograph turntable;

x.

La Caille tapedeck (two channel);

y.

Two of the three wall clocks;

z.

Apple computer, printer and software;

aa.

The flower set of Franciscan china;

bb.

The Sango china;

cc.

The set of Nachmann whisky beakers;

dd.

The Rosenthal crystal;

ee.

Copper pots and pans;

ff.

Pewterware;

gg.

Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy

hh.

Desk in the laundry room;

ii.

The old green table from "Pops;"

jj.

One cardtable

tableclothes;

with one round piece of

glass

and one rectangular piece;
kk«

The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar;

11.

The

National

Geographic

books

and

magazines

and the bookcase in the study;
mm,

Handtools and power tools;

nn>.
The aquarium;
oo.
All of Defendant's personal clothing
and
items, including uniforms;
pp.
All items purchased by Defendant before marriage to include textbooks and records;
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qq.

Remainder of the flatware set;

rr.

Balance of Defendant's business records,

ss.

Large china hutch obtained from P. D. 0. in

Germany;
15.

16,

The plaintiff is specifically awarded
a.

The Gieol painting;

b.

Two Bassett paintings;

c*

The four-channel tape drive;

d.

Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer);

e.

SANSUI tuner;

f.

Grundig console and six speakers;

g.

AKAI tape deck (larger);

h.

Cassette deck;

i.

One of the three wall clocks;

j.

Pewter candlesticks;

k.

French hutch;

1.

Twelve Hummel figurines; and

m.

One set of tools for use around the house/.

^f^.

The defendant shall make available to the plain-

tiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so that they
can be reproduced on a cassette, *V pyr*4*<k ~pbu, ^ *w^w»»3"
"

cyj^^;

17. Each of the parties is awarded all items of per-

sonal property in his/her possession not hereinabove>specified.
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18.

The defendant is ordered to make available :o the

plaintiff any pictures, photographs or slides which she wishes
duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense.
19.

The plaintiff is awarded all of the accounts of

the children established with funds from the plaintiff's inheritance and the right and obligation to manage those accounts, and
the defendant is ordered to take appropriate steps to turn those
over to the plaintiff.
20.

All right, title and

interest

in the home on

Wasatch Drive is awarded to the plaintiff, free of any interest
of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first mortgage
and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately $4,000.00
due to the Pentagon Credit Union and approximately $3,500.00 to
the Norwest Credit Union.

The plaintiff shall be responsible for

these obligations from and after August 1, 1987, and she is
ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom.
21.

The Trinidad note is awarded to the defendant,

free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.
22.

Each of the parties is awarded one of the Horizon

lots which have no present value.
23.

The defendant is awarded the interest of the par-

ties in the United funds IRA account, the Fidelity Destiny Fund,
the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy,
the Air Defense Center Savings account, the Air Defense Center

-7-

checking account, his Pentagon Credit Union account and his First
Security checking account.
24.

The

plaintiff

account, the Magellan

is

fund, the

awarded

the

Continental

family AT&T

IRA

stock, and her

accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union and plaintiff's
Pentagon Credit Union account.
25.

The defendant is awarded the 1980 Oldsmobile and

the plaintiff is awarded the 1982 Volvo and the 1986 Jetta.
26.
1

The/$32,384.00 earned fey^fe^e^lef-g*Ksk

#>v

i^ana^eme^b^e£- the property inherited by the plaintiff is not considered an asset of the marriage.
27.

The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement

of the account balance due as of May 1, 1986.
with having paid $140.00 on the account.

He is credited

Each of the parties

shall be obligated to pay one-half of the account balance as of
May 1, 1986.

If, after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the

defendant, there is a balance due of less than $140.00, it shall
be paid by the plaintiff.

If the amount due, after credit of the

$140.00 is more than $140.00, the defendant shall pay that sum to
the plaintiff or judgment shall be entered
one-half of the balance over $280.00.

in her favor for

If the defendant, by pay-

ing $140.00 shall have paid more than one-half of the amount that
was due on May 1, 1986, the amount by which he has exceeded payment of one-half of the balance due shall be a credit against the
child support he shall have been ordered to pay.
-8-

28,
that bills

The court heard testimony about the possibility

for psychological

counseling and orthodontic care

remain unpaid, but evidence was not presented as to amounts which
were sufficient for the court to make a firm determination.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, if there are orthodontic bills due which have not been paid by insurance, each of the
parties shall pay one-half of that unpaid balance and one-half of
any counseling bills incurred for and on behalf of the children*
If there is a bill for counseling for the defendant, he shall pay
it himself*
29.

The defendant

is ordered to pay the obligations

due to MasterCharge and First Security Bank and to hold the
plaintiff harmless therefrom*
30*

Each of the parties shall assume, pay and hold the

other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since their
separation.
31*

Each of the parties shall assume and pay their own

costs and fees as incurred in this matter*
32*

The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid

by the defendant is denied, as she has substantial resources of
her own to pay her own fees*
33*

The court determined

regarding temporary support.

that there was a dispute

The defendant is ordered to verify

that all of the checks he testified he has transmitted to the
plaintiff shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her.

-9-

If

he determines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he is
ordered

to

put

stop

orders

against

those

checks

and write

replacement checks.
34.

Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited

from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting to
intimidate the other in any way, wherever they may be or reside.
35.

The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims

that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who
contends that the fund is an income stream., not an asset because
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that

n

the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement pa^lupon which the
court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties
is reserved until the obligation to pay child support terminates.
36.

The court declares that it ^believes that it has

divided the property of the parties withf$87,7u7.00 being awarded
to the plaintiff and£$99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^
and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for financial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate.
37.

The court has determined that it should award to

the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting

-10-

<*<:K)2d3r

that as part of the marital estate, although the defendant has
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the
inheritance!through the management of the defendant be considered
as a marital asset.
DATED this

~tf

ft

day of

4lih^yJ!j^^

, 1987.

KENNETHRIGTRUP
District Court Judge
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK

By

-11-
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Arizona, Art IV(f); id. There is nothing
in the record to indicate that Arizona authorized this state to entertain Ellis's petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to his transfer to Arizona, indeed
Ellis attempts to force the hand of Arizona
by requesting this state to return him to
the prison facilities there. Such a decision
would fly in the face of the agency relationship established in the compact Id.
Ellis must address his request for return
to the authorities of the state of Arizona,
and if that state chooses to retain him in
the Utah facilities until his release, Utah
courts will not have jurisdiction to rule
otherwise. His release will have to take
place in the state of Arizona, with Arizona
bearing the cost of his return to its territory, unless Ellis, Arizona, and Utah agree
upon his release in some other place. Art.
IV(g). This state is bound by the terms of
the compact, which makes a decision of the
sending state in respect of any matter over
which it retains jurisdiction under art IV(c)
"conclusive upon and not reviewable within
the receiving state/' Art. V(a).

vorce decree. Wife appealed, and husband
cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Orme, J., held that (1) court erred in postponing apportionment of retired husband's
military retirement pension, and (2) although court had power to order wife to
execute forms necessary for husband to
claim federal tax dependency exemptions
for one of their children, whose custody
was awarded to wife, whether such award
was appropriate use of discretion could not
be determined, given extensive reassessment of property and support questions
that trial court might order on remand
given appellate alteration of pension decision.
Reversed in part and remanded.

1. Divorce <3=>252.3(4)
Interest in retirement plan accrued
during marriage is considered marital asset
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.

The appeal is dismissed.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate CJ.,
and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JX,
concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result

Barbara J. MOTES, Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Preston J. MOTES, Defendant,
Respondent, and
Cross-Appellant
No. 880015-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 16, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1990.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered di-

2. Divorce <3=>252.3(4)
Postponing equitable distribution of
husband's retirement benefits for purpose
of funding higher child support payments
to wife than would be otherwise appropriate was error, where net effect of such
approach was to fund husband's support
obligations through what amounted to apportionment of wife's property; postponement was also inappropriate because husband had retired and present value of
wife's share of fixed stream of income
could be readily calculated and compensated for with distribution of other assets,
cash out over comparatively short time or
provision for wife to receive her share
monthly.
3. Divorce <&=>308
Internal Revenue <$=*3297
Amendment to Internal Revenue Code
under which custodial parent is automati
cally entitled to available dependency exemptions unless custodial parent signs
written declaration to contrary did not di-
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vest state courts of their traditional power
to allocate federal tax dependency exemptions, and state courts thus have power to
order custodial parent to execute declaration in favor of noncustodial parent; no
authority indicates that Congress intended
to divest state courts of their traditional
authority and to bestow collateral economic
benefit on custodial parents. 26 U.S.CA.
§§ 152, 152(eX2).
4. Divorce <s=308
Trial court's power to order custodial
parent to execute declaration allowing noncustodial parent to take tax exemption for
child should be limited to those situations
where noncustodial parent has higher income and provides majority of support for
child or children whose exemption is
claimed—support at level which can be increased as result of reduction in his or her
tax burdens; it would be abuse of discretion for divorce court to order custodial
parent to sign off declaration in absence of
appropriately supported findings to that effect or demonstration of other exceptional
circumstances making it in best interest of
parties and their children that declarations
be signed.
Kent M. Kasting (argued), Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff, appellant, and cross-respondent
David S. Dolowitz (argued), Julie A.
Bryan, Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, Salt
Lake City, for defendant, respondent, and
cross-appellant
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD
and ORME, JJ.

whose custody was awarded to plaintiff.
This issue is the primary focus of our opinion. Defendant's cross-appeal concerns the
profits generated during the marriage
through his investment and management of
plaintiffs inheritance. We reverse in part,
affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married in
1967. At that time, defendant was three
years into his career as a military officer
and plaintiff was a nurse. During the marriage, defendant obtained a Masters of
Business Administration degree from the
University of Utah, and plaintiff secured a
Bachelor of Science degree in nursing. ,At
the time this action was filed, defendant
had retired from the mihtary and was
working as a financial planner, and plaintiff was working as a nursing supervisor
and attempting to obtain her Master's degree in nursing. Defendant claimed he
suffered a net loss each month from his
financial planning work. Plaintiff earned a
monthly net income of approximately
$1700.
At trial, the parties stipulated to the division of a large part of the marital property,
leaving disputes primarily as to the division
of defendant's military retirement benefits,
which were generating payments of approximately $1500 per month; plaintiffs
retirement fund, which held approximately
$5100; and plaintiffs substantial inheritance and the additional funds generated
through investment and growth of the inheritance proceeds.

Following trial, at which plaintiff represented herself, plaintiff was awarded custoORME, Judge:
dy of the children. The court awarded
Plaintiff Barbara Motes appeals from th<& defendant the right to receive the full
the trial court's entry of a divorce decree, amount of his military retirement during
claiming the court erred in postponing th<» the period in which he was to pay child
apportionment of defendant Preston support The court reasoned that, absent
Motes's military retirement fund. Plaintiff this income, defendant would be unable to
also challenges the court's power to order meet his child support obligations, which
her to execute the forms necessary for the court had set based on defendant redefendant to claim the federal tax depend- ceiving the full amount of his monthly reency exemption for one of their children tirement benefits. The court determined
OPINION
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that the final disposition of both parties'
retirement accounts would be settled when
defendant's child support obligations
ceased, some five years hence. Plaintiff
was awarded the full amount of her inheritance and the full amount of the investment income derived therefrom, and defendant was awarded the federal tax dependency exemption for one of the children.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court
erred in awarding defendant the full
amount of his monthly military retirement
benefits, even though for the well-intentioned purpose of enabling defendant to
satisfy his child support obligations. Plaintiff also contends the court exceeded its
authority in ordering her to execute the
documents necessary for defendant to
claim the dependency exemption for one of
the children on his federal tax return. Defendant cross-appeals, seeking a portion of
those funds he claims to have generated by
prudently investing plaintiffs inheritance.1
I.
RETIREMENT INCOME AND
INVESTMENT PROCEEDS
FROM INHERITANCE
[1] The interest in a retirement plan
accrued during marriage is considered a
marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. See, e.g., Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Utah
1988); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d
431, 432 (Utah 1982); Dogu v. Dogu, 652
R2d 1308, 1310 (Utah 1982); Greene v.
Greene, 751 P.2d 827, 830-31 (Utah CtApp.
1988); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84, 86
(Utah CLApp.1988); Bailey v. Bailey, 745
P.2d 830, 831 (Utah CtApp.1987); Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 204-05
(Utah CtApp.1987). The best method for
distributing or allocating retirement benefits or their value depends on the particular
circumstances, see Gardner, 748 P.2d at
1079, but where possible the purpose to
advance is that of "end[ing] marriage and
1. The record does not contain a satisfactory
explanation as to why defendant's claimed financial prowess enabled him to so greatly enhance the value of plaintiffs inheritance while
his professional investment activities are so un-

allowpng] the parties to make as much of a
clean break from each other as is reasonably possible." Id. Obviously, postponing
even a decision on ultimate distribution of
both retirement plans for some five years
is inimical to that goal. But see Rayburn
v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 241-42 (Utah
CtApp.1987) (cash-out of one spouse's interest in retirement fund over five-year
period was acceptable where total value of
retirement was substantial and installment
cash-out approach was only alternative to
longer entanglement).2 Thus, as between
decreeing a more immediate adjustment or
simply deferring the other spouse's participation until payments are eventually received, our Supreme Court has stated that
the latter "alternative should be employed
only in rare instances." Gardner, 748 P.2d
at 1079. Such instances include cases
"where other assets for equitable distribution are inadequate or lacking altogether,
or where no present value can be established
" Id. (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 NXSuper. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76,
79-80 (1981)).
[2] However, unlike all but one of the
cases cited in the preceding paragraph, the
instant case does not involve the difficult
questions presented by retirement programs held by those still working, which
will—or may—only eventually result in income. In the instant case, like in Greene,
one spouse had already retired and his retirement benefits had ripened into monthly
payments, see 751 P.2d at 828, the present
value of which could be readily ascertained.
Treatment of such benefits is less problematic than in the usual case. The present
value of plaintiff's share of the now-fixed
stream of income, which the benefits have
become, can be readily calculated and compensated for with distribution of other assets having an equivalent value or cashed
out over a comparatively short time. That
failing, provision can simply be made for
plaintiff to receive her share monthly, the
successful that his expenses exceed his commissions.
2. The Rayburn-type treatment was endorsed in
Gardner. See 748 P.2d at 1079.
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approach taken in Greene. See 751 P.2d at
827.
Instead, the trial court in this case postponed the distribution of defendant's retirement benefits for the purpose of funding
higher child support payments to plaintiff
than would otherwise have been appropriate. But the net effect of such an approach is to fund defendant's support obligations through what amounts to an appropriation of plaintiffs property. It is no
answer that the appropriation may be rescinded or ameliorated in five years. The
retirement plans of both parties should
have been treated as marital assets and
definitively dealt with in the decree as part
of an equitable property distribution between the parties. Accordingly, we reverse the court's treatment of both parties'
retirement funds and remand for distribution in accordance with the foregoing.
The collateral effect of our reversing the
trial court's handling of the parties' retirement plans is that we must also remand for
reconsideration the child support award
and the disposition of proceeds generated
through the investment of plaintiffs inheritance. From all that appears, the court's
disposition of these items was inextricably
linked with its decision to deprive plaintiff
of participation in defendant's retirement
fund for at least five years.3
II.

FEDERAL TAX DEPENDENCY
EXEMPTION
[3] The most significant question this
case presents & whether a c&Vorce court
has the authority to award a tax exemption
to the noncustodial parent by ordering ths
custodial parent to execute the necessary
federal tax form- Two prior decisions of
this court, Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2<i
942 (Utah CtApp.1988), and Martinez v.
i. We do not suggest that it would necessarily be
inappropriate to award defendant's share of tht
inheritance profits to plaintiff in exchange for
retirement benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled. That may well be an element
of an equitable overall distribution- See, e.g.t
Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1079 (one "alternative
would be reapportionment of the property di$-
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Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah CtApp.), cert
granted, 765 P 2d 1277 (Utah 1988), dealt
generally with the Question of dependent
tax exemptions in the divorce context.
However, neither involved an actual order
that the forms be executed. See Fullmer,
761 P.2d at 949-50; Martinez, 754 P.2d at
72. Thus, the precise issue is presented to
us for the first time in this case.
A. SECTION 152
Prior to the 1985 tax year, section 152 of
the Internal Revenue -Code provided that a
noncustodial parent was entitled to claim a
dependency exemption in any tax year
where that parent paid more than $1200
toward the child's support, and the custodial parent "did not clearly establish that
[the custodial parent] provided more support of such child ... than the parent not
having custody." This rule apparently created recurring headaches for the Internal
Revenue Service. The usual scenario began with a noncustodial parent who had
paid more than $1200 toward the child's
support, thus meeting the minimal threshold requirement under section 152. However, the parents were often in disagreement as to which of them had actually paid
the majority of the child's support It was
apparently not uncommon for the dispute
to be "resolved" by both parents claiming
an exemption for the child on their respective tax returns. * When this "double-dipping" was detected, the IRS was forced to
audit both parents' returns and otherwise
investigate to determine which one actually
had paid the majority of the child's support
and was therefore entitled to the dependency exemption. If nothing else, the situation amounted in an inefficient expenditure
of effort by the IRS.
In 1984, Congress accordingly amended
section 152 to provide that the custodial
parent is automatically entitled to the
available dependency exemptions unless he
tribution to offset the value of the retirement
account"). But the court's findings do not establish that this is what the court did here, at
least not with any precision. The general question of defendant's entitlement to some part of
the growth of the inherited funds is governed by
Kiortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304.308 (Utah
1988).
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intended to terminate the established practice of state courts allocating exemptions,
"it is more reasonable than not to infer
that... Congress would have said so." Id.
at 458. See also In re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 Ill.App.3d 212, 127 Ill.Dec. 411,
419, 533 N.E.2d 29, 37 (1988); Wassif v.
Wassif, 77 Md.App. 750, 551 A.2d 935, 940
(1989).
Second, Congress did not intend such a
result. The 1984 amendment "was meant
to address the desire of the IRS not to get
involved in [disputes between parents over
exemptions] where it had very little, if anything, to gain by the outcome." Wassif,
551 A.2d at 939. The Congressional record
supports that characterization of the
amendment
The present rules governing the allocations of the dependency' exemption are
often subjective and present difficult
problems of proof and substantiation.
The Internal Revenue Service becomes
involved in many disputes between parB. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
ents who both claim the dependency exemption based on providing support over
Prior to the 1984 amendment, it was unithe
applicable thresholds. The cost to
formly held that state courts had authority
the parties and the Government to reto allocate dependency exemptions in divorce cases.4 See, e.g., Lincoln v. Lincoln, solve these disputes is relatively high
and the Government generally has little
155 Ariz. 272, 746 P.2d 13, lfr-17 (CtApp.
tax revenue at stake in the outcome.
1987); Lorenz v. Lorenz, 166 Mich.App. 58,
The committee wishes to provide more
419 N.W.2d 770, 771 (1988); Fudenberg v.
certainty by allowing the custodial
Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn.Ct.App.
spouse the exemption unless that spouse
1986); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 456
waives his or her right to claim the ex(W.Va.1987). Thus, the amendment would
emption. Thus, dependency disputes behave to be construed as a substantial detween parents will be resolved without
parture from prior substantive law for one
the involvement of the Internal Revenue
to conclude that state courts do not still
Service*
have this power. This is an unreasonable
construction of the amendment for two rea- H.R.Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt
sons.
II, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. &
First, the amendment does not expressly Admin.News 697, 1140. Following the
divest state courts of their traditional pow- amendment, all the IRS need concern itself
er, "and this silence demonstrates Con- with when facing a noncustodial parent
gress's surpassing indifference to how the claiming an exemption is whether the cusexemption is allocated as long as the IRS todial parent has executed the requisite
doesn't have to do the allocating." Cross, declaration. See Einhorn, 127 Ill.Dec. at
363 S.E.2d at 457. Had Congress actually 419, 533 N.E.2d at 37. The administrative

or she "signs a written declaration . . . that
such custodial parent will not claim such
child as a dependent" and "the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration
to [his or her tax] return...." 26 U.S.C.
§ 152(e)(2) (1988).
The issue before us in this case is whether a state court may order the custodial
parent to execute the required declaration
allowing the noncustodial parent to claim
the exemptions. We hold that state courts
do retain their traditional authority to allocate dependency exemptions notwithstanding the 1984 amendment. Our conclusion
is based on an analysis of Congress's intent
in enacting the 1984 amendment; the lack
of a provision explicitly divesting state
courts of their consistently recognized preamendment authority to allocate exemptions; the significant majority of other jurisdictions holding that state courts retain
such authority; and the impracticality and
irrationality of a contrary ruling.

*. The pre-amendment allocation was typically
accomplished by a court order providing that
the noncustodial parent be entitled to take the
exemntion if current in child sunnort The

"current in child support" proviso was incorporated into the decree in this case as well, an
entirely sensible condition.
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ease of such a procedure is obvious, but it In re Marriage of Milesnick, 765 P.2d at
should be of no concern to the IRS if the 754. See Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz.
declaration was executed entirely voluntar- 272, 746 P.2d 13, 16-17 (Ct.App.1987); In
ily, in accordance with a stipulated settle- re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 Ill.App.3d
ment, or pursuant to court order. The IRS 212, 127 Ill.Dec. 411, 417-19, 533 N.E.2d
is merely interested in the orderly adminis- 29, 35-37 (1988);6 In re Marriage of Lotration of revenue collections, which is en- vetinsky, 418 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Iowa Ct.App.
hanced by doing away with the "majority 1987); Wassif v. Wassif 77 Md.App. 750,
of support" test That test necessitated 551 A.2d 935, 939-40 (1989); Fudenberg v.
extensive audits by the IRS, while compli- Moisted, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn.App.
ance with the signed declaration require- 1986); McKenzie v. Jahnke, 432 N.W.2d
ment can be ascertained most expediently. 556, 557 (N.D.1988); Hughes v. Hughes, 35
We are not cited to, nor have we located, Ohio St.3d 165, 518 N.E.2d 1213, 1214-16,
any authority indicating that Congress in- cert denied, — U.S.
, 109 S.Ct 124,
tended the 1984 amendment to divest state 102 L.Ed.2d 97 (1988); Cross v. Cross, 363
courts of their traditional authority and S.E.2d 449, 456-60 (W.Va.1987); Pergolski,
bestow a collateral economic benefit on 420 N.W.2d at 417. See also Jensen v.
custodial parents. Nor can we identify any Jensen, 753 P.2d 342, 345 (Nev.1988) (per
legitimate policy reason for Congress to curiam) (a custodial parent can be ordered
assert an interest in the division of what is to execute a "waiver" of dependency extantamount to marital property, a task tra- emption, but only if a similar result cannot
ditionally reserved under our federal sys- be achieved by adjusting alimony and child
tem for each state's domestic relations support to achieve after-tax financial paricourts.
ty).
In sum, the amendment was merely inWe find Hughes, 518 N.E.2d at 1214-17,
tended to enhance the administrative con- to be particularly compelling. In Hughes,
venience of the IRS, not to interfere with the sole issue on appeal was identical to the
state court prerogatives, 5 See, e.g., Fu- major issue before us here. The majority
denberg v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 considered at length the purpose for the
(Minn.CtApp.1986); In re Marriage of Mi- 1984 amendment and concluded it was
lesnick, 765 P.2d 751, 754 (Mont.1988);
made for the administrative convenience
Pergolski v. Pergolski, 143 Wis.2d 166, 420
of the Internal Revenue Service. A doN.W.2d 414, 417 (CtApp.1988).
mestic relations court has broad discretion to determine the proper mix and
C. CASE AUTHORITY
allocation of marital assets and property
The vast majority of other jurisdictions
rights in a divorce proceeding
We
to confront the issue have concluded that
find nothing in the legislative history of
state courts retain the authority to order
the [1984 amendment] to support [the]
the custodial parent to execute the declaratheory that new Section 152 was meant
tion contemplated by the 1984 amendment
to encroach upon this exclusive statutory
15 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) 1335 (May 16, 1989);
power of state courts
The only con5. It is noteworthy that Congress, motivated by a
desire to minimize administrative problems for
the IRS, tailored its amendment to reflect a
presumption that in the typical case, the custodial parent will indeed be the one providing most
support. If it assumed the routine situation
would be otherwise, Congress would have provided that the noncustodial parent would be
entitled to the exemptions absent a declaration
from the custodial parent.
6. It appears that two divisions of the Illinois
Court of Appeals have split on this issue. See In
re Marriage of Emery, 179 Ill.App.3d 744, 128

Ill.Dec. 569, 573, 534 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1989).
The analysis in Einhorn is much more compelling. Einhorn carefully analyzes both sides of
the issue. Emery, on the other hand, disposes
of the issue in one conclusory paragraph, without even acknowledging the previously decided
Einhorn opinion or the weight of authority to
the contrary. Additionally, it is not clear that
the trial court in Emery had actually ordered the
custodial parent to execute the necessary declaration. See 128 Ill.Dec. at 573, 534 N.E.2d at
1018.
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cern of the IRS, evident from the history
surrounding the changes, is that only one
divorced spouse claim and receive the
deduction.
Id at 1215-16. In contrast, the Hughes
dissenters argued that section 152 requires
a voluntary waiver by the custodial parent, not one compelled by court order. Id
at 1217 (Wright, J., dissenting). Although
one can only infer the basis for the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, — U.S.
, 109 S.Ct 124,102 L.Ed.2d 97 (1988), it
may be significant that section 152 is not
couched in terms of a "waiver," but only of
a "declaration."7
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has had
several opportunities to pass on this issue
and consideration of those cases is also
instructive. In Valento v. Valento, 385
N.W.2d 860, 863 (Minn.CtApp.1986), the
court of appeals held that a lower court
had not abused its discretion in refusing to
order the custodial parent to execute a
section 152 declaration. Id However, by
considering the refusal on its merits instead of simply holding the lower court had
no authority to do otherwise, the court of
appeals implicitly concluded that state
courts do have authority to allocate dependency exemptions notwithstanding the 1984
amendment. This position was clarified by
the court a few months later in Fudenberg
v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19 (Minn.CtApp.
1986). In that case, the court first analyzed the legislative history of the amendment and, citing Valento, concluded that
"[s]tate court allocation of the exemption
does not interfere with Congressional intent
Thus, allocation of the exemption
is permissible." 390 N.W.2d at 21. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the
lower court wh^ch had previously ruled it
had no authority to allocate the exemption.
See also Theroux v. Boehmler, 410 N.W.2d
354, 358 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (because trial
court did not expressly order custodial
spouse to execute waiver, its allocation of
7. There are at least three reasons for the Supreme Court to have granted certiorari in
Hughes if it felt the case was wrongly decided.
First, the case exclusively involves the interpretation of federal law; second, a few state courts
have adopted a different interpretation, one

the dependency exemptions to noncustodial
spouse was ineffective); Gerardy v. Gerardy, 406 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn.CtApp.1987)
(same); Thesing v. Thesing, 390 N.W.2d
469, 472 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (trial court
erred in holding it had no power to require
custodial spouse to execute declaration;
case remanded for reconsideration).
There is admittedly a split of authority
on this question and a minority of courts
considering the issue have held that the
1984 amendment divests state courts of
their traditional authority to allocate dependency exemptions and that state courts
may not order custodial parents to execute
section 152 declarations. 15 Fam.L.Rep.
(BNA) 1335 (May 16, 1989). See McKenzie
v. Kinsey, 532 So.2d 98, 100 (Fla.DistCt.
App.1988); Lorenz v. Lorenz, 166 Mich.
App. 58, 419 N.W.2d 770, 771-72 (1988);
Gleason v. Michlitsch, 82 Or.App. 688, 728
P.2d 965, 967 (1986); Sarver v. Dathe, 439
N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (S.D.1989); Davis v.
Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711, 717-18 (Tex.Ct.App.
1986). Cases following the minority view
are unpersuasive for at least two reasons.
First, these cases recognize, as they
must, that a dependency exemption generally provides afinancialbenefit to the parent entitled to claim it in the form of reduced income taxes. See, e.g., Sarver, 439
N.W.2d at 552. Thus, courts must consider
which parent will receive this benefit in
setting child support and alimony. At least
three courts have even gone so far as to
remand cases where the exemption was
held on appeal to have been improperly
awarded to the noncustodial parent, recommending that the trial court reduce the
previously awarded child support and alimony in light of the noncustodial parent's
loss of thisfinancialbenefit See Lorenz,
419 N.W.2d at 772; Sarver, 439 N.W. at
552; Davis, 707 S.W.2d at 718. This result, while unavoidable under the minority
view, is bizarre, with dependent children
the ultimate victims. As pointed out quite
consistent with that espoused by the dissenters
in Hughes, thus creating a split in authority,
and third, the issue involves substantial policy
questions and implicates the division of power
under our federal scheme.
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convincingly in Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 458-59,
the minority view forces state courts to
achieve financial parity indirectly, by downwardly adjusting otherwise appropriate alimony and child support, rather than achieving parity directly, by sensibly allocating
the exemptions.
Second, these cases are lacking in
thoughtful or disciplined analysis. For example, the Florida Court of Appeals rejects
Cross and its progeny because "deductions
and exemptions . . . are not to be extended
beyond the clear import of the language
used." McKenzie, 532 So.2d at 100 n. 3.
However, as pointed out above, section 152
merely grants the noncustodial parent the
right to an exemption if he or she secures a
declaration from the custodial parent Section 152 is absolutely silent as to whether
or not state courts may direct the custodial
parent to execute the declaration as part of
its overall disposition. Thus, the McKenzie
court offends the very theory it purports to
uphold by imposing prohibitions on state
courts which are not expressly or impliedly
imposed by section 152.
Similarly, in Gleason, 728 P.2d at 967,
the Oregon Court of Appeals concludes,
without analysis, that "p]n the circumstances here, the court should not have
designated which party would receive the
dependency exemption." Gleason obviously ignores the rationale of the more recent
cases rejecting its conclusion, and in this
light, its one-sentence, conclusory holding
is not very compelling. Finally, we find
Justice Neely*s criticism of Davis, 707
S.W.2d 711, to be perceptive, as well as
colorful. See Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 458r-60.
Justice Neely concludes that "Davis v.
Fair is an extremely formalists opinion
that strains at a gnat but swallows a camel." 363 S.E.2d at 458.
D. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
State divorce courts must always recognize the financial benefit accompanying dependency exemptions when awarding alimony and child support. However, income
tax exemptions are only valuable to persons with income, and up to a certain point,
the higher the income the more valuable

the financial benefit, given the progressivity of the federal income tax. Cross, 363
S.E.2d at 460. Prohibiting state courts
from allocating the available exemptions to
the parent receiving the greatest economic
benefit often results in the unnecessary
depletion of limited family resources.
[4] Thus, use of the power to order a
custodial parent to execute a section 152
declaration should not be used to evenly or
otherwise divide the available exemptions
without regard to the particular economic
realities. On the contrary, it should be
limited to those situations where the noncustodial parent has the higher income and
provides the majority of support for the
child or children whose exemption is
claimed—support at a level which can be
increased as a result of a reduction in his
or her tax burdens. Indeed, it would be an
abuse of discretion for a divorce court to
order a custodial parent to sign the declaration in the absence of appropriately supported findings to that effect or demonstrating other exceptional circumstances
making it in the best interest of the parties
and their children that the declarations be
signed. The declarations are not to be
used as a kind of "consolation prize" for
parents who are losing daily association
with their children. Moreover, by ordering
the custodial parent to execute the declaration, the court actually gives the custodial
parent a tool to compel timely support payments. The court's order should provide
that the duty to execute the declaration at
the end of each year is contingent on the
noncustodial parent being current in support payments. See also note 4, supra.
The custodial parent may then rightfully
refuse to execute the declaration if support
payments are owing, thereby creating an
economic incentive for the noncustodial
parent to comply with his or her support
obligations.
As observed in Sarver, "[t]his is not a
question . . . of 'overridpng] federal tax
law' or 'unconstitutional meddling with
Congressional authority.' It is simply a
matter of determining and preserving the
most resources in situations of obvious lim-
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ited resources/' 439 N.W.2d at 554 (Sabers, J., specially concurring).

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

E. CONCLUSION

The court having fully considered the
petition for rehearing filed herein by appellant now orders as follows:

In summary, we conclude the 1984
amendment to section 152 does not divest
state courts of their traditional power to
allocate federal tax dependency exemptions, and state courts have the power to
order a custodial parent to execute a declaration in favor of the noncustodial parent
The contrary position followed by only a
minority of jurisdictions was not intended
by Congress, especially given the lack of an
express termination of the traditional approach of state courts to dependency-exemption allocation. Finally, the practical
effect of a contrary ruling would essentially prevent state courts from taking permissible advantage of progressive tax brackets
and maximizing the resources available to
support divorcing parents and their families. All of that having been said, the
power to order execution of a section 152
declaration should be cautiously and prudently used, with the sole objective of maximizing the financial resources available to
the "family" unit
The court in this case had the requisite
judicial power to direct plaintiff to execute
the section 152 declaration for defendant's
benefit as an aspect of its overall property
distribution. Whether or not that disposition was an appropriate exercise of discretion need not be decided in view of the
extensive reassessment of property and
support questions which will occur on remand. In the process of that reassessment, appropriate disposition of the tax
exemptions, and the question of any related
orders concerning execution of section 152
declarations, will depend on the economic
realities which emerge and must be in accordance with the views expressed in this
opinion.
The parties shall bear their own costs
and attorney fees incurred on appeal.
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.;

1. The petition is denied.
2. In concluding Section I of its opinion
with a provision for "remand for reconsideration" of various aspects of the trial
court's decree, this court meant not to suggest any particular outcome following reconsideration. Rather, the court merely
recognized that its alteration of pivotal portions of the trial court's decree may necessitate reassessment and adjustment of other portions of the decree and that the trial
court had the authority to reconsider its
decree in light of this court's opinion and
make such adjustments in its decree as
may be necessary to achieve an equitable
overall result See also Halladay v. Cluff,
739 P.2d 643, 645 n. 5, (Utah CtApp.1987)
("Trial courts are in a much better position
to evaluate an entire case, including its
nuances and undisclosed pitfalls, than an
appellate court. It is for this reason that
where, as in this case, all possible ramifications of a decision on appeal may not be
readily apparent, a case will be remanded
for such proceedings as are appropriate in
view of the guidance offered in the opinion.").
3. Likewise, nothing in this court's opinion should be taken to limit the trial court's
ability to adapt its decree to the existing
facts and circumstances of the parties and
to the parties' reliance on the initial decree
and their compliance therewith, nor to
make such adjustments and incorporate
such credits and offsets as may be appropriate.

